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Lowering the Jurisdictional Bar: A Call for an 
Equitable-Factors Analysis Under CERCLA’s 
Timing-of-Review Provision* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review has been a core concept in American jurisprudence 
for over 200 years.1  Despite its relatively long history, several recurring 
issues regarding judicial review still remain.  One such issue involves the 
timing of review.  In other words, assuming that judicial review is 
available, when can a party seek such review?  Statutes sometimes 
attempt to regulate the timing of judicial review.  One example of this 
phenomenon occurs in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 
CERCLA emerged as part of Congress’s broader attempt to create an 
effective legal and regulatory framework for waste management in the 
United States.3  Specifically, CERCLA’s goal is to manage the cleanup 
of abandoned hazardous waste sites.4  It evidences Congress’s 
recognition of the need to undo damage done to the environment because 
of human activity.  This law was a bold step in the right direction when 
Congress passed it, but it has shortcomings.  One particular problem is 
CERCLA’s timing-of-review provision.5  This provision creates a 
jurisdictional bar, which limits judicial review of response actions that 
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 1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is 
customarily credited with establishing the power of judicial review.  CHARLES A. SHANOR, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION 17 (3d ed. 2006). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
 3. Another important aspect of this framework was the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976 (RCRA), which governs the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.  See id. §§ 6901–
6992. 
 4. Brian Patrick Murphy, Note, CERCLA’s Timing of Review Provision: A Statutory Solution 
to the Problem of Irreparable Harm to Health and the Environment, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 587, 
587 (2000). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
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seek to clean up hazardous waste sites.6  The goal of the timing-of-
review provision is to prevent delays in remediating these contaminated 
sites.7  Despite this laudable goal, and a seemingly sensible mechanism 
to achieve it, courts have been unable to agree on the appropriate 
meaning and application of the timing-of-review provision. 
A recent circuit split between the Seventh and Tenth Circuits 
demonstrates the difficulties wrought by the timing-of-review provision.  
In Frey v. EPA8 and Cannon v. Gates,9 appellate courts reached starkly 
different conclusions about how to apply the timing-of-review provision 
under somewhat similar factual circumstances.  This circuit split is only 
the most recent example of a long-simmering problem regarding the 
interpretation and application of the timing-of-review provision. 
This Comment seeks to resolve the timing-of-review conundrum by 
calling for the Supreme Court to provide guidance to lower federal 
courts.  Specifically, the Supreme Court should adopt an equitable-
factors analysis for dealing with timing-of-review cases.  Part II of this 
Comment will examine the background issues related to the timing-of-
review provision.  First, Part II will provide an overview of CERCLA.  It 
will look at how and why Congress passed CERCLA and how Congress 
subsequently amended it to add the timing-of-review provision.  Part II 
will then present a survey of the timing-of-review jurisprudence.  Finally, 
Part II will examine Frey and Cannon in detail, explaining how the 
courts interpreted and applied the timing-of-review provision. 
Part III will propose a solution to resolve the timing-of-review 
problem.  First, it will discuss why the Supreme Court, rather than 
Congress, is best positioned to clarify the meaning and application of the 
timing-of-review provision.  Second, it will examine the different bases 
for Supreme Court action.  Third, it will lay out the equitable-factors 
analysis that the Supreme Court should adopt. 
                                                     
 6. See id. § 9613(h)(4). 
 7. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 8. 403 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 9. 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. An Overview of CERCLA 
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 in response to rising public 
concern about toxic waste pollution across the United States.10  
Specifically, Congress tried to close a gap in the existing environmental 
protection framework.11  Congress had passed the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA)12 in 1976 “to regulate the methods of disposal 
and the amount of hazardous waste being dumped at functional 
hazardous waste facilities.”13  RCRA, however, only dealt with 
functional hazardous waste sites and thus did not address the increasing 
number of abandoned hazardous waste sites throughout the United 
States.14  Seeking to address this deficiency, Congress enacted CERCLA 
to “provide a swift, comprehensive federal program for the cleanup of 
abandoned hazardous waste sites throughout the United States.”15  To 
effectuate this broad goal, CERCLA focused on three areas: (1) 
identifying abandoned hazardous waste sites, (2) cleaning those sites up, 
and (3) holding the parties responsible for the contamination financially 
accountable for the cleanup costs.16 
Congress’s motivation for passing CERCLA included not only 
environmental considerations, but political ones as well.  Democrats had 
lost majorities in both houses of Congress in the 1980 elections.17  As a 
result, Congress hastily passed CERCLA “in the waning days of the 
Carter Administration.”18  To move CERCLA through Congress quickly, 
certain rules were suspended to limit debate in both houses.19  Because of 
the lack of debate, Congress did not work out procedural defects or 
potential conflicts between CERCLA and other laws.20  The main 
consequence of CERCLA’s hasty passage was that federal courts 
                                                     
 10. Murphy, supra note 4, at 587–88. 
 11. See id. at 591 (noting the insufficiency of the RCRA). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006). 
 13. Murphy, supra note 4, at 591. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. (citing JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, HAZARDOUS WASTE 180 (2d ed. 
1993)). 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. at 593. 
 18. Theresa Sauer, Comment, DANGER! Bombs May Be Present.  Cannon v. Gates: A Jammed 
Cannon Preempts Citizen Suit Indefinitely, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2009). 
 19. Murphy, supra note 4, at 593–94. 
 20. Id. at 594. 
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repeatedly had to adjudicate disputes related to the “statutory absurdities 
and inconsistencies that permeated the statute.”21 
1. The Mechanics of CERCLA 
Congress gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the 
authority to implement CERCLA.22  Generally speaking, the EPA has 
three main tasks.  The first task is to establish a national hazardous 
substance response plan, which includes a National Priorities List that 
ranks hazardous waste sites based on the risk they pose to public health 
and the environment.23  The second task is to undertake response actions 
that will remove contaminants and remediate the affected sites.24  The 
third task, if necessary, is for the EPA to recover its remediation 
expenses from certain statutorily defined groups that are liable for such 
costs.25 
The EPA’s most complex task under CERCLA is the second—
undertaking response actions.  Response actions fall into two categories: 
removal actions and remedial actions.26  A removal action is a short-term 
measure designed to reduce urgent environmental threats.27  A remedial 
action, meanwhile, is a long-term measure designed to provide a 
permanent remedy for hazardous waste contamination.28  At the very 
minimum, a remedial action must clean up a contaminated site in a way 
that protects human health and the environment.29 
CERCLA specifies a process for the EPA to follow when 
undertaking a response action.30  First, the EPA orders a remedial 
                                                     
 21. Id. 
 22. Megan A. Jennings, Note, Frey v. Environmental Protection Agency: A Small Step Toward 
Preventing Irreparable Harm in CERCLA Actions, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 675, 678 (2006). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (2006); see also Jennings, supra note 22, at 678 (“CERCLA directs 
EPA to establish a National Priorit[ies] List (NPL) by identifying the hazardous waste sites that pose 
the most serious threats . . . .”). 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1); see also Jennings, supra note 22, at 678 (noting that the EPA 
must “order or initiate response actions”). 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also Jennings, supra note 22, at 678 (stating that the EPA can 
“recover costs from potentially responsible parties (PRPs) who fall into one of four specified 
categories of liability”). 
 26. Jennings, supra note 22, at 678. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23); see also Jennings, supra note 22, at 678 (defining a removal 
action as “a short-term response to reduce environmental danger in an urgent situation”). 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); see also Jennings, supra note 22, at 678 (defining a remedial 
action as one that is “intended to provide for the long-term viability of [a contaminated] site”). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d); Jennings, supra note 22, at 678. 
 30. Jennings, supra note 22, at 678. 
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investigation to determine the scope of the contamination.31  Second, the 
EPA conducts a feasibility study to determine the costs and benefits of 
potential cleanup methods.32  The EPA can carry out the remedial 
investigation and the feasibility study itself, or it can supervise the owner 
or operator of the contaminated site in doing so.33  Third, the EPA issues 
a report setting out a remedial action plan, which is based on the results 
of the remedial investigation and the feasibility study.34  Fourth, the EPA 
must afford interested parties an opportunity to comment on its proposed 
remedy.35  Finally, the EPA must publish a record of decision that 
officially establishes the selected remedy.36 
2. The Addition of the Timing-of-Review Provision 
The original version of CERCLA “was silent on whether parties 
could seek judicial review of ongoing cleanup actions.”37  After the 
passage of CERCLA, many potentially responsible parties sued the EPA 
in federal court in an attempt to “delay or evade financial 
responsibility.”38  Because of the lack of guidance from the statute itself, 
courts dealing with these lawsuits initially reached inconsistent results.  
Some courts allowed challenges to CERCLA’s constitutionality at any 
time during remediation, while other courts prohibited both 
constitutional and statutory challenges while remediation was ongoing.39  
Over time, federal courts settled on a “clean up first, litigate later” 
doctrine, which was based on the idea that Congress intended to preclude 
all judicial review until remediation of a contaminated site was 
completed.40 
Recognizing CERCLA’s shortcomings, Congress overhauled the Act 
in 1986.41  This revision was called the Superfund Amendments and 
                                                     
 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(d) (2010) (laying out the 
requirements for conducting a remedial investigation). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e) (laying out the requirements for 
conducting a feasibility study). 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). 
 34. See id. §§ 9617(a)(1), 9621(a)–(b). 
 35. See id. § 9617(a)(2). 
 36. See id. § 9617(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f) (laying out the requirements for selecting 
a remedy). 
 37. Jennings, supra note 22, at 679. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sauer, supra note 18, at 1220. 
 40. Jennings, supra note 22, at 679. 
 41. Murphy, supra note 4, at 596–97. 
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Reauthorization Act (SARA).42  Among the many changes, SARA added 
§ 9613(h)43—the timing-of-review provision.44  The goal of § 9613(h) 
was “to prevent private responsible parties from filing dilatory, interim 
lawsuits which have the effect of slowing down or preventing EPA’s 
cleanup activities.”45  Congress feared that “[w]ithout such a provision, 
responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances 
could be unduly delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat of damage to 
human health or the environment.”46  This section thus essentially 
adopted the “clean up first, litigate later” doctrine that the courts had 
fashioned before Congress enacted SARA.47 
Section 9613(h) expressly codified a general bar to judicial review of 
response actions taken under CERCLA, except for the limited situations 
spelled out in the subsections.48  In relevant part, § 9613(h) reads: 
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction . . . to review any 
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of 
this title [authorizing response actions], or to review any order issued 
under section 9606(a) of this title [authorizing abatement orders], in 
any action except . . . : 
. . . . 
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) 
alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 
of this title or secured under 9606 of this title was in violation of any 
requirement of this chapter.  Such an action may not be brought with 
regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the 
site.49 
The statutory language in the timing-of-review provision holds two 
competing aspects.  On the surface, § 9613(h)(4) appears to acknowledge 
that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits challenging 
CERCLA response actions.50  In practice, however, this section can 
actually limit jurisdiction over citizen suits.51  This dual nature has 
                                                     
 42. Jennings, supra note 22, at 679. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006). 
 44. Jennings, supra note 22, at 679. 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 99-253(I), at 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2941. 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 99-253(V), at 25 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3148. 
 47. Jennings, supra note 22, at 679. 
 48. Id. at 680. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006). 
 50. Jennings, supra note 22, at 680. 
 51. Id. 
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created difficulties for courts trying to interpret the timing-of-review 
provision. 
B. A Survey of Timing-of-Review Jurisprudence 
The interpretation of the timing-of-review provision raises three 
distinct issues for courts.52  First, when is a response action “selected,” 
thus precluding judicial review?53  Second, when is the response action 
completed, thus lifting the bar on judicial review?54  Third, should courts 
recognize an exception to the general bar on judicial review in certain 
situations?55  This last issue, in particular, is not surprising given the 
divided opinions evident in SARA’s legislative history.56  The case law 
in the wake of SARA reveals disparate answers to these questions.  
Specifically, two competing interpretations of the timing-of-review 
provision emerged after SARA.  Some courts adopted a relaxed 
interpretation of the timing-of-review provision where its operation 
depends on the type of harm alleged.  Other courts adhered to a strict 
interpretation where the type of harm alleged is immaterial to the 
operation of the timing-of-review provision. 
1. Relaxed Interpretations of the Timing-of-Review Provision 
a. Cabot Corp. v. U.S. EPA57 
The contaminated site in Cabot Corp. was Moyer’s Landfill, located 
in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.58  The EPA began planning a 
response action at Moyer’s Landfill in 1983 and issued a record of 
decision in September of 1985.59  In December of 1986, a group of 
potentially responsible parties petitioned the EPA to modify its record of 
decision and adopt an alternative cleanup plan devised by the parties.60  
The EPA rejected the alternative plan, and, once it was clear the two 
sides could not reach an accommodation, the potentially responsible 
                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 57. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 58. O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 59. Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 824–25. 
 60. Id. at 825. 
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parties sued.61  They argued that the EPA had violated CERCLA because 
it failed to select the most cost-effective cleanup remedy.62  In response, 
the EPA moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment for the same reason.63 
The district court analyzed the timing-of-review provision’s 
legislative history.64  The legislative history revealed that some members 
of Congress made a “distinction between suits focusing on health or 
environmental concerns and suits alleging monetary harm.”65  This 
distinction was reinforced by Congress’s “decision to enable EPA to 
clean up hazardous waste sites prior to litigating the allocation of the 
expenses of those cleanups.”66  Based on these considerations, the court 
concluded that “[h]ealth and environmental hazards must be addressed as 
promptly as possible rather than awaiting the completion of an 
inadequately protective response action.”67  If the potentially responsible 
parties had alleged “that EPA’s chosen response action posed a risk of 
irreparable harm to health or the environment,” their claim would not be 
barred by the timing-of-review provision.68  But because the parties were 
alleging essentially monetary harms, the court barred their claim.69  
Under the Cabot Corp. analysis, the timing-of-review provision does not 
always act as an absolute bar to judicial review.  Rather, the operation of 
the timing-of-review provision depends on the type of harm alleged. 
b. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.70 
In Princeton Gamma-Tech, the defendant owned property above the 
Passaic Formation aquifer in New Jersey.71  Trichloroethylene 
contaminated the groundwater on Gamma-Tech’s property at two 
different sites.72  Under CERCLA, the EPA placed both sites on the 
                                                     
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 826. 
 64. Id. at 829. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 829–30. 
 70. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled en banc by Clinton Cnty. Comm’rs v. U.S. EPA, 116 
F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 71. Id. at 140. 
 72. Id. 
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National Priorities List.73  The EPA issued a record of decision in 1988 
outlining its cleanup plan, which focused on treating the contaminated 
water and monitoring water quality.74  The EPA sued Gamma-Tech in 
1991, seeking reimbursement for response costs it incurred at the two 
contaminated sites.75  Gamma-Tech filed a cross-motion for a 
preliminary injunction to stop the EPA from pursuing its cleanup plan, 
arguing that the EPA’s proposed remedy would “exacerbate the existing 
environmental damage and cause further irreparable harm to the 
environment.”76  The district court stated that, based on the language of 
the statute and interpretive case law, it did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over claims challenging a remedial action by the EPA until a 
distinct phase of the cleanup was complete.77 
On appeal, the Third Circuit began by analyzing the overall structure 
of § 9613(h).  While § 9613(h) generally barred preliminary judicial 
review of response actions by the EPA, it did include several 
exceptions.78  The existence of these exceptions showed that Congress 
did not intend to create an absolute bar to judicial review.79  Thus, like 
the district court in Cabot Corp., the Third Circuit did not view the 
judicial review bar in absolute terms. 
Having examined the overall structure of § 9613(h), the Third Circuit 
then turned to the citizen-suit exception under § 9613(h)(4).  It first 
examined prior interpretive case law, which held that citizen suits were 
barred until the cleanup remedy was completed.80  Those cases were 
distinguishable because they did not deal with “bona fide assertions of 
irreparable environmental damage resulting from violations of 
CERCLA’s policies.”81  The court felt that in situations “where 
irreparable environmental damage will result from a planned response 
action, forcing parties to wait until the project has been fully completed 
before hearing objections to the action would violate the purposes of 
CERCLA.”82  Moreover, forcing parties to wait in such situations would 
“effectively nullif[y]” the citizen-suit provision.83  Such a statutory 
                                                     
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 140–41. 
 75. Id. at 141. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 142. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 144. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 144–45. 
 83. Id. at 146. 
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construction would yield an absurd result.84  Based on its analysis, the 
Third Circuit concluded “that when irreparable harm to the public health 
or the environment is threatened, an injunction may be issued under the 
citizens’ suit exception of subsection 9613(h)(4) even though the cleanup 
may not yet be completed.”85  Princeton Gamma-Tech thus supported the 
same reasoning as Cabot Corp.—courts should not categorically apply 
the timing-of-review provision without consideration of the type of harm 
alleged. 
2. Strict Interpretations of the Timing-of-Review Provision 
a. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry86 
The McClellan Air Force Base, located near Sacramento, California, 
served as an aircraft depot and maintenance center since the 1930s.87  As 
such, various toxic materials were used at the base.88  After these toxic 
materials served their purpose, they became hazardous waste in need of 
disposal.89  For decades, McClellan Air Force Base responded to this 
problem by disposing of vast quantities of hazardous waste in 
underground pits on the base.90  Unfortunately, some of this buried waste 
leaked into the surrounding groundwater.91  In an attempt to remedy the 
contamination, McClellan Air Force Base initiated a two-phase cleanup 
program.  First, it began monitoring groundwater quality in 1979.92  
Second, it implemented a groundwater extraction system, which 
mechanically extracted contaminated groundwater from the earth and 
treated it.93  McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS), a citizens 
group, challenged this cleanup program, alleging myriad violations of 
various environmental statutes.94  The district court ruled that § 9613(h) 
of CERCLA barred MESS’s suit because MESS challenged selected 
removal and remediation actions.95 
                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 148. 
 86. 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 87. Id. at 327. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 328. 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected MESS’s argument that  
§ 9613(h) did not apply to its suit.96  Examining the statutory language, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that § 9613(h) was an unqualified withdrawal 
of federal jurisdiction.97  Furthermore, the statutory language embodied 
Congress’s determination that the “need for swift execution of CERCLA 
cleanup plans outweighs” concerns about a lack of judicial review.98  
Thus, unlike in Cabot Corp. and Princeton Gamma-Tech, the McClellan 
court found context-specific analysis unnecessary to determine the 
operation of the timing-of-review provision.  The court was aware that its 
interpretation of § 9613(h) could greatly delay judicial review—perhaps 
even permanently—but held that rectifying such a potential injustice was 
Congress’s job, not the courts’.99  McClellan thus represents a categorical 
interpretation of the timing-of-review provision based solely on the 
language of the statute. 
b. Clinton County Commissioners v. U.S. EPA100 
The Third Circuit revisited the timing-of-review provision in Clinton 
County.  This case involved a chemical manufacturing facility located in 
Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, and operated by Drake Chemical from the 
1940s until 1982.101  More than forty years of continuous operation left 
the site contaminated with various toxic substances hazardous to both 
human health and the environment.102  The EPA took over the site and 
initiated “clean-up efforts pursuant to its response authority under 
CERCLA.”103  After six years of study, the EPA decided on a final 
remedy for the site, which involved excavating the contaminated soil, 
treating it in an on-site mobile incinerator, and returning it to the 
ground.104 
The plaintiffs sued seeking a preliminary injunction under 
CERCLA’s citizen-suit provision,105 claiming that the incinerator remedy 
would release “dangerous amounts of highly toxic chemicals that would 
                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 329. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 101. Id. at 1020. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006). 
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contaminate the local air, soil, and food chain, creating an unacceptable 
risk of cancer and other serious illnesses.”106  The district court dismissed 
the complaint, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.107  Specifically, 
the court “held that . . . CERCLA’s ‘timing of review’ provision 
precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction over a citizens’ suit 
challenging an EPA remedial action prior to the completion of the 
action.”108  The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s ruling.109 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that CERCLA’s citizen-suit 
provision conferred jurisdiction despite the limitations of the timing-of-
review provision because the complaint made “bona fide allegations of 
irreparable harm to public health or the environment.”110  The Third 
Circuit, sitting en banc, disagreed and affirmed the district court’s 
decision, stating that “Congress intended to preclude all citizens’ suits 
against EPA remedial actions under CERCLA until such actions are 
complete, regardless of the harm that the actions might allegedly 
cause.”111 
The court based this conclusion on several factors.  The first factor 
was the statutory language.  Because § 9613(h)(4) only allowed judicial 
review of actions that had been “taken,” this was “a clear indication of 
[Congress’s] intention that citizen-initiated review of EPA removal or 
remedial actions take place only after such actions are complete.”112  
Furthermore, § 9613(h) generally precluded review of “selected” 
remedial actions while the exception in § 9613(h)(4) allowed for judicial 
review in citizens’ suits alleging that actions “taken” violated 
CERCLA.113  In explaining the difference between the terms “selected” 
and “taken,” the court stated: 
[T]he most reasonable distinction between the two terms is that a 
remedial action “selected,” which federal courts have no jurisdiction to 
review, is one chosen but not fully implemented, while a remedial 
action “taken,” which a federal court may review for compliance with  
 
                                                     
 106. Clinton Cnty., 116 F.3d at 1021. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1022. 
 112. Id. at 1022–23. 
 113. Id. at 1023. 
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the requirements of CERCLA, is one that was chosen and has been 
completed.114 
Additionally, according to the last sentence of § 9613(h)(4), “‘an action 
may not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is 
to be undertaken at the site.’”115  This language showed that the EPA 
could undertake both a removal and a remedial action at the same site to 
deal with the same release of hazardous materials.116  In such a situation, 
“a citizens’ suit challenging a ‘removal’ action may not be brought even 
after completion of that removal action, so long as ‘remedial’ action 
remains ‘to be undertaken.’”117  Both removal and remedial actions had 
to be complete before judicial review.118 
The second factor the court considered was the legislative history of 
§ 9613(h).  Specifically, the court examined the Conference Report on 
the Superfund Amendments of 1986, the Report of the House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, and the Report of the House Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation.119  Language in each report discussed 
how challenges to EPA response actions could not be brought until such 
actions were completed.120  This reinforced the preclusion of judicial 
review. 
The final factor the court considered was congressional intent.  The 
court reasoned that adopting the plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 9613(h)(4) 
would go against Congress’s clearly expressed intent.121  The plaintiffs’ 
interpretation “would create a situation in which response actions could 
be seriously delayed while EPA refutes allegations of irreparable harm 
which, while ‘bona fide,’ may simply reflect a legitimate difference of 
opinion about the preferred remedy for a particular site.”122  Congress 
intended for such differences of opinion to be communicated and 
resolved during the public notice and comment period that occurred 
before remediation.123 
                                                     
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (emphasis in statutory language was added by the court) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) 
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 117. Id. 
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 119. Id. at 1023–24. 
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In addition to discussing the several bases for its holding, the court 
addressed its prior decision in Princeton Gamma-Tech and rejected its 
conclusion.124  In the court’s view, Congress clearly thought delays in 
remediation were more dangerous than the risk of errors by the EPA in 
selecting response actions.125  Further, the public still had a chance to 
make its voice heard in the selection of response actions for 
contaminated sites via the “elaborate pre-remediation public review and 
comment procedures,” which served as a substitute for judicial review.126  
Finally, with such clear statutory language and congressional intent, it 
was not a reviewing court’s job to second-guess Congress’s policy 
choices.127  Thus, the court explicitly overruled “that portion of Princeton 
Gamma-Tech which held that a district court has jurisdiction under  
§ 9613(h)(4) during the pendency of an EPA remedial action when 
plaintiffs make bona fide allegations of irreparable harm.”128 
C. The Current Circuit Split 
1. Frey v. EPA 
On January 4, 1983, the United States filed a civil suit against 
Viacom to force it to clean up two dump sites in Bloomington, Indiana, 
that were contaminated by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).129  
Subsequently, the City of Bloomington sued Viacom in connection with 
two other contaminated sites.130  Both of these lawsuits were 
consolidated and two additional contaminated sites were added, bringing 
the total number of contaminated sites to six.131  The parties entered into 
a consent decree in 1985, which required Viacom to fully excavate and 
incinerate all PCBs at the six contaminated sites.132  The incineration 
provision made the consent decree controversial.133  Frey sued in 1988,  
 
                                                     
 124. Id. at 1024–25.  For a discussion of Princeton Gamma-Tech, see supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 125. Clinton Cnty., 116 F.3d at 1025. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Frey v. EPA, 403 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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challenging the incineration remedy mandated by the consent decree.134  
The court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.135 
After Frey failed to stop the incinerator remedy in court, the Indiana 
State Legislature passed a law to block construction of the proposed 
incinerator.136  With the incinerator option legislatively invalidated, an 
alternative remedy was needed to clean up the contaminated sites.137  
Negotiations to determine a new cleanup remedy deadlocked over the 
scope of the remediation effort.138  Meanwhile, the district court issued 
an order requiring remediation of the contaminated sites by 1999.139  To 
meet the deadline, the district court appointed a special master to help the 
parties resolve their disputes and move forward.140  While these events 
were occurring, the EPA moved through the process of selecting its own 
final remedy to replace the invalidated incinerator option.141  The 
proposed final remedy called for excavation and removal of material 
from hot spots and the subsequent creation of a landfill cap.142 
After the EPA issued its proposed final remedy, Frey sued again—
this time contending that the EPA’s selected remedy failed to bring the 
contaminated sites into compliance with CERCLA and other 
environmental statutes.143  The key issue was whether CERCLA’s 
timing-of-review provision barred Frey’s suit.144  The Seventh Circuit 
had previously interpreted the timing-of-review provision “as requiring a 
citizen seeking to challenge a remediation action to wait for the selected 
action to be completed.”145  Frey argued that CERCLA did not bar her 
suit because the EPA’s only selected remedy, excavation, had been 
completed.146  The EPA moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
                                                     
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 831.  A landfill cap “is a containment technology that forms a barrier between the 
contaminated media and the surface, thereby shielding humans and the environment from the 
harmful effects of its contents and perhaps limiting the migration of the contents.”  Landfill Caps 
and Enhancements, CENTER FOR PUB. ENVTL. OVERSIGHT, http://www.cpeo.org/techtree/ttdescript/ 
lancap.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
 143. Frey, 403 F.3d at 832. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (citing Frey v. EPA, 270 F.3d 1129, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 2001); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 
1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 146. Id. at 833. 
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concrete and existing remedial measures were still underway at the 
contaminated sites.147  To support this argument, the EPA produced 
evidence that water and sediment investigations were ongoing.148  The 
district court concluded that the EPA had not selected a remedy for water 
treatment and sediment removal but that active remedial planning was 
underway.149  Therefore, the district court held that Frey’s lawsuit was 
premature and barred by the timing-of-review provision.150 
On appeal, Frey argued that the court should interpret the statute to 
allow a citizen to sue once a selected remedy is complete.151  In the 
instant case, the only remedy the EPA had selected—the excavation of 
the PCBs—had been completed.152  Because the EPA had selected no 
other remedy, no remedial action remained to be completed.153  
Therefore, § 9613(h) should not bar Frey’s suit.154  The EPA, on the 
other hand, based its argument on the court’s holding in Frey’s first suit 
that “a citizen suit may not go forward when only one stage of a broader 
remediation plan has been completed.”155  The EPA said that the 
excavation of PCBs was only one stage of its overall remediation plan 
and, therefore, Frey could not sue until all phases of remediation were 
completed.156 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the EPA’s argument.  Fundamentally, 
the EPA’s interpretation of § 9613(h) was too broad because it insulated 
the EPA from judicial review as long as it had “any notion that it might, 
some day, take further unspecified action with respect to a particular 
site.”157  More specifically, the statute did not support such an “open-
ended prohibition on a citizen suit.”158  For § 9613(h) to bar Frey’s suit, 
the EPA had to point to an “objective referent that commits it and other 
responsible parties to an action or plan.”159  In the present case, no such 
objective referent was present because there was “no timetable or other 
objective criterion by which to assess when EPA’s amorphous study and 
                                                     
 147. Id. at 832–33. 
 148. Id. at 831. 
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investigation phase may end.”160  The EPA attempted to give the court 
some sort of timetable by hinting at the possibility of more water and soil 
treatment remedies in 2005 or 2006, but such a vague assertion—for 
which there was no support in the record—was insufficient.161  While 
recognizing that the EPA needed time to compile data and evaluate 
alternative options before settling on a final remedy, the court would not 
allow the EPA to do so without some transparency.162  The court required 
no formal procedure before § 9613(h) could apply; all that the court 
required was some form of “objective indicator that allows for an 
external evaluation, with reasonable target completion dates, of the 
required work for a site.”163  Simply pointing to “ongoing testing and 
investigation, with no clear end in sight,” was not a sufficient indicator to 
trigger the protections of § 9613(h).164 
The court thought its approach was particularly appropriate given the 
facts of the case.  The only thing it observed in the record was “a 
desultory testing and investigation process of indefinite duration,” which 
did not satisfy the objective-criterion requirement.165  Furthermore, the 
court said its holding was appropriate in light of Congress’s intent.166  
While Congress wanted remedial action completed before allowing 
judicial review, the court did not believe that Congress intended to 
extinguish judicial review completely.167 
2. Cannon v. Gates 
James Cannon owned more than 1400 acres of land in Utah’s Yellow 
Jacket Mines area.168  His land sat next to the U.S. Army’s Dugway 
Proving Grounds.169  In 1945, Cannon granted the United States War 
Department a six-month lease over his land.170  As part of the deal, the 
government agreed to return Cannon’s property to him in the same 
condition as when the government first started using it.171  Over the 
                                                     
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 834–35. 
 163. Id. at 835. 
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 166. Id. at 836. 
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 168. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1330 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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course of the lease, the government dropped at least 3000 rounds of 
ammunition and twenty-three tons of chemical weapons on Cannon’s 
property.172  After the lease ended, the government returned the land to 
Cannon as promised, but it was blanketed with fragments of shells, 
rockets, and bombs the government had dropped during its weapons 
tests.173 
Cannon quickly took legal action.  He filed two administrative 
claims against the government in 1945—one for disrupting mining 
activities and the other for destruction of mineshaft timbering.174  The 
government settled both claims, for $755.48 and $2064.00, 
respectively.175  In 1950, Cannon filed a third claim against the 
government but this time based the claim on his inability to lease his 
mines because they were potentially filled with poisonous gas.176  This 
claim was denied.177  Only in the 1970s did the government even begin to 
study the contamination of Cannon’s property.178  The study did not 
amount to action, however, and Cannon’s land remained 
contaminated.179 
Because of the government’s inaction, the Cannon family continued 
to pursue its quest to make the government clean up the land.  Cannon’s 
son picked up where his father had left off but was unsuccessful in 
getting the government to clean up the property.180  In 1998, Cannon’s 
grandchildren sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act.181  
They succeeded at trial and were awarded $160,937 in damages.182  The 
appeals court, however, reversed the award, finding that the claim was 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.183 
In 2005, the Cannon family attempted a different tactic and filed 
claims against the government under several federal environmental 
protection laws.184  The district court dismissed all of the Cannons’ 
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claims based on the timing-of-review provision’s jurisdictional bar.185  
The court held that the government’s preliminary investigations into 
whether cleanup efforts were needed on the Cannons’ property 
constituted selection of a removal action, thus triggering § 9613(h).186  
The Cannons appealed the district court’s decision.187 
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by looking at the text of  
§ 9613(h), focusing on the words “challenges” and “selected.”188  The 
court interpreted the statutory language to mean that once the United 
States has “selected” a remedy, that selection cannot be “challenged” 
until it is completed.189  With this background, the court set out to answer 
two questions: (1) whether the United States had “selected” a removal or 
remedial action and, (2) if so, whether the Cannons’ claims amounted to 
a “challenge” of the removal or remedial action.190 
In response to the first question, the court concluded that the United 
States had selected a removal action because it had taken several steps to 
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release of hazardous substances on the 
Cannons’ property.191  It rejected the Cannons’ counter-contention that 
the government could not select a removal action until it had complied 
with every applicable regulation.192  The court reasoned that nothing in  
§ 9613(h) suggested the jurisdictional bar only applied if the government 
had completed a substantial portion of its removal action.193  Moreover, 
the Cannons’ suit constituted a challenge to the government’s removal 
action because it sought injunctive relief, which would interfere with the 
implementation of the government’s ongoing removal efforts.194  While 
the court sympathized with the Cannons’ frustration at the long delay in 
the cleanup of their property, it could not intervene because the Cannons’ 
suit fell “within the broad ambit of § 9613(h).”195  As a result, the court 
affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Cannons’ suit.196 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Despite statements from some courts that § 9613(h) has clear 
statutory language and is a clear expression of congressional intent,197 the 
lack of uniformity among the courts when dealing with the timing-of-
review provision indicates otherwise.198  The case law shows that courts 
have struggled to determine what the timing-of-review provision means, 
what Congress intended by passing it, and how it should apply in various 
situations.199  Like many other legal issues, the resolution depends on the 
facts of the case presented.  In many situations, it is relatively clear that 
Congress meant for the timing-of-review provision to bar judicial review, 
such as where a potentially responsible party is trying to delay 
remediation to avoid having to pay for the cleanup.  However, there are 
situations—like those in Frey v. EPA and Cannon v. Gates—where 
strictly applying the timing-of-review provision can lead to inequitable 
results.200  In those cases, strict application of the timing-of-review 
provision could permanently delay judicial review because it is unclear 
when the EPA would complete its response actions.  Because of this 
potential for unfairness—and also because the lower federal courts 
cannot agree on a uniform approach for applying the timing-of-review 
provision—the Supreme Court needs to clarify the operation and 
applicability of this troublesome provision. 
A. Rationales for Seeking a Judicial Resolution to the Timing-of-Review 
Problem 
This Comment is not the first to discuss the confusion surrounding 
CERCLA’s timing-of-review provision.201  It differs from previous 
scholarship by suggesting that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to 
interpret the timing-of-review provision and resolve the circuit split on 
this issue.  Others who have examined this problem have addressed their 
recommendations to Congress and suggested that it should amend 
CERCLA to deal with the issues raised by the case law interpreting the 
                                                     
 197. See, e.g., Clinton Cnty. Comm’rs v. U.S. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1997) (en 
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 198. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. See supra Part II.B. 
 200. See supra Part II.C. 
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timing-of-review provision.202  Those are valid recommendations.  In 
fact, Congress should be the body that revises unclear statutes such as 
CERCLA. 
Unfortunately, these exhortations to Congress will probably not yield 
tangible results because Congress is unlikely to resolve the timing-of-
review issue any time soon.  Congress currently faces a variety of other 
crises that require immediate attention.  In the face of such large-scale 
and vexing problems, it is unlikely that revising a single subsection in an 
environmental statute will be at the top of Congress’s agenda.  As a 
result, federal courts are the only remaining avenue for relief.  While 
several federal district and appellate courts have attempted to provide 
such relief,203 a uniform interpretation remains elusive.  Because the 
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of federal law, it has the power to 
settle the circuit split discussed in this Comment by interpreting how the 
timing-of-review provision should operate and apply. 
B. Two Bases for Supreme Court Action 
The timing-of-review problem presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation and construction.  As such, two arguments justify Supreme 
Court intervention.  First, the language of the timing-of-review provision 
is ambiguous and requires clarification.  Second, even if the language 
were clear, applying it literally could produce absurd results contrary to 
Congress’s intent, thus necessitating Supreme Court intervention. 
1. Clarifying Ambiguous Statutory Language 
The key issue in the timing-of-review debate is determining the 
meaning of the statute.  In such a situation, the language of the statute is 
the starting point.204  A prevailing rule of statutory interpretation is the 
plain meaning rule, which says that reviewing courts should adhere to the 
plain meaning of a statute whenever possible.205  Thus, if the statutory 
                                                     
 202. See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 22, at 697; Murphy, supra note 4, at 629; Sauer, supra note 
18, at 1236–37. 
 203. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 204. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“The task of resolving the 
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 205. See 2A SINGER, supra note 204, § 46:01, at 113. 
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language is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court should not go 
beyond the plain meaning of the statute’s words.206  On the other hand, a 
reviewing court may use extrinsic aids if the statutory language is 
ambiguous.207  Extrinsic aids are sources outside the text of the statute, 
including legislative history and evidence of the legislature’s intent.208 
The timing-of-review provision is an example of an ambiguously 
written statute.  Specifically, the statute is ambiguous in two ways.  First, 
it is “open to two or more constructions.”209  The alternative 
constructions do not have to focus on particular words in the statute; 
rather, conflicting constructions “may arise in respect to the general 
scope” of the statute.210  This is precisely the case with the timing-of-
review provision.  The circuit split on the application of the timing-of-
review provision demonstrates this fact.211  Some courts interpret the 
provision as a categorical bar to judicial review while other courts take a 
more nuanced view of the provision that allows judicial review in certain 
instances. 
The root of the ambiguity lies in the imprecise statutory language.  
The key words are “selected” and “taken.”  Section 9613(h) bars judicial 
review of response actions that have been “selected.”212  In Frey, the 
timing-of-review provision did not bar Frey’s suit when the EPA’s 
actions were limited to testing and investigation of what remedies to 
employ.213  In other words, the EPA had not selected a remedy.  
Conversely, in Cannon, the Tenth Circuit held that the EPA “selected” a 
response action when it was studying and analyzing the contamination, 
but had not taken any concrete steps to ameliorate it.214  Thus, it is 
unclear whether preliminary steps constitute a “selected” response 
action. 
Section 9613(h)(4) allows judicial review of actions that have been 
“taken.”215  An action is “taken” when it is picked out, selected, or 
chosen.216  Section 9613(h)(4) gives no indication that an action must be 
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complete to be “taken.”  The fact that courts cannot review actions 
“brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be 
undertaken”217 does not clarify whether all response actions must be 
complete before judicial review can occur.  This language seems to allow 
judicial review once a remedial action is started but is not yet 
complete.218  Because the statutory language is susceptible to various—
and contradictory—interpretations, the Supreme Court needs to provide 
guidance as to its meaning. 
Second, the timing-of-review provision is ambiguous because 
“giving a literal interpretation to the words would lead to such 
. . . unjust . . . consequences as to compel a conviction that they could not 
have been intended by the legislature.”219  Specifically, interpreting the 
timing-of-review provision literally allows the EPA to perpetually study 
and investigate—without ever taking any concrete response actions—
absent any fear of judicial review.  Both the Frey and Cannon courts 
recognized this possibility.220  This risk is more than just theoretical.  
More than sixty years have passed since James Cannon leased his land to 
help the war effort, yet his property remains contaminated.221  Under the 
ruling in Cannon, it could be another sixty years before anything 
happens.  This unconscionable result could not possibly have been 
Congress’s intent when it added the timing-of-review provision to 
CERCLA.  It bears repeating that CERCLA’s goal is the swift cleanup of 
contaminated sites.222  Sixty years and counting of contamination is 
anything but swift. 
Importantly, the existence of a prevailing interpretation of the 
timing-of-review provision does nothing to undermine its ambiguity.  
Just because many courts—though by no means all—have interpreted the 
timing-of-review provision similarly does not automatically make it clear 
and unambiguous.223  Ambiguity is not based on how many courts  
 
                                                     
 217. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). 
 218. Despite the lack of clarity, many courts have relied on the fact that the statute “refers to 
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interpret a statute one way versus another; it depends on the existence of 
multiple interpretations of the same language. 
2. Going Beyond Plain Meaning to Prevent Unintended Results 
Even if one accepts the argument that the language of the timing-of-
review provision is unambiguous, the Supreme Court may go beyond the 
provision’s plain meaning.  Generally, courts adhere to the plain meaning 
of a statute when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.224  
Such a bright-line rule can potentially lead to harsh results, as seen in 
Cannon.  As a result, a qualification to the plain meaning rule exists to 
mitigate its severity.  The qualification says that even if the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court can nevertheless 
engage in statutory interpretation when applying the statute as written 
will lead to “a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters.”225  Put another way, courts are only constrained by the plain 
meaning rule as long as the literal interpretation of the statute “is not 
utterly absurd.”226 
In the context of the timing-of-review provision, a literal reading of 
the statute could produce a result that is both absurd and contrary to 
Congress’s intent.  When drafting CERCLA, Congress intended to 
protect the public and redress injuries caused by contaminated waste 
sites.227  As a result, courts have consistently categorized CERCLA as a 
remedial statute.228  A remedial statute is one that is “protective in 
nature.”229  CERCLA is a remedial statute because it protects the public  
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from the risks of contaminated waste sites by seeking to clean them up 
promptly.230 
Employing a literal reading of the timing-of-review provision that is 
confined to the language of the statute could undermine Congress’s 
intent.  To understand why, consider the factual scenario in Cannon.231  
There, the government was studying and investigating the contaminated 
property.232  No action had been taken to actually clean up the 
contamination.233  Furthermore, the government gave no indication that it 
was remotely close to taking concrete action.234  Thus, the litigation 
posed no threat of delay for the response action.  To the contrary, the 
government’s lack of action caused the delay in the first place.  By 
applying a literal reading of the timing-of-review provision, the Tenth 
Circuit allowed the government to continue studying and analyzing—
without taking any action—indefinitely.  This result is contrary to 
Congress’s goal to use CERCLA to achieve timely cleanups.  The point 
is, in certain situations, a nonliteral reading of the timing-of-review 
provision—that is, a reading using extrinsic aids going beyond the plain 
meaning of the statute—better serves Congress’s goal of prompt cleanup. 
In addition to going against Congress’s intent, a literal application of 
the timing-of-review provision can produce absurd results.  The facts of 
Cannon are once again instructive.235  In that case, the government had 
not taken any concrete steps to remedy the contamination; it was merely 
studying, investigating, and analyzing.236  By employing a literal 
interpretation of the timing-of-review provision, the Tenth Circuit 
ensured that the government could continue taking preliminary steps 
without any possibility of its actions being reviewed in court.  This result 
is absurd for two reasons.  First, it leaves the Cannon family without a 
mechanism to redress their injuries.  They are at the mercy of an 
indeterminately long planning-and-analysis phase that has no end in 
sight.  Furthermore, the Cannons cannot even force the government to 
justify its lack of action because of the complete protection the literal 
reading of the timing-of-review provision provides.  Second, a literal 
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reading of the timing-of-review provision is absurd because it could not 
possibly follow Congress’s intent when it added the timing-of-review 
provision to CERCLA.  The timing-of-review provision was meant to 
prevent dilatory tactics by potentially responsible parties who sought to 
avoid having to pay for the contamination they caused.237  It was not 
designed to completely insulate the government from judicial review of 
its cleanup actions—which is precisely the situation that a literal reading 
can create. 
C. The Equitable-Factors Analysis 
The previous Section established two bases that justify the Supreme 
Court going beyond the plain meaning of the statute and employing 
extrinsic aids to interpret the timing-of-review provision.  This Section 
discusses the equitable-factors analysis.  First, it examines why 
considering the equities of a situation is appropriate when analyzing 
timing-of-review cases.  Second, it proposes several equitable factors 
that courts should include in the analysis.  Third, it discusses the 
potential policy benefits of adopting the equitable-factors analysis. 
1. The Basis for Focusing on Equitable Considerations 
The legislative history behind the passage of § 9613(h) supports the 
use of an equitable-factors analysis.  Certain members of Congress 
clearly did not favor an absolute bar to preenforcement judicial review 
that ignored the context of a particular situation.  For example, 
Democratic Senator George Mitchell of Maine stated: “In considering 
whether citizens’ suits should lie for cleanup, it is important to consider 
the equities of the situation . . . [and] courts should carefully weigh 
[those] equities . . . .”238  Republican Senator Robert Stafford of 
Vermont, while not explicitly mentioning the consideration of equitable 
factors, noted: 
It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens’ rights to 
challenge response actions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are 
implemented even in part because otherwise the response could  
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proceed in violation of the law and waste millions of dollars . . . before 
a court has considered the illegality.239 
Moreover, the language of the Joint Conference Committee Report 
regarding SARA undermines the argument for an absolute bar.  The 
Report stated: 
In new section [9613(h)(4)] of the [statute], the phrase “removal or 
remedial action taken” is not intended to preclude judicial review until 
the total response action is finished if the response action proceeds in 
distinct and separate stages.  Rather an action under section [9659] 
would lie following completion of each distinct and separable phase of 
the cleanup. . . . Any challenge under this provision to a completed 
stage of a response action shall not interfere with those stages of the 
response action which have not been completed.240 
It is important to note that the legislative history regarding the 
timing-of-review provision is not completely one-sided.  In particular, a 
difference of opinion surfaced among the proponents of SARA on the 
application of the timing-of-review provision.241  Exemplifying a more 
rigid interpretation of the timing-of-review provision, Republican 
Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina said: “Completion of all of 
the work set out in a particular record of decision marks the first 
opportunity at which review of that portion of the response action can 
occur.”242  Thurmond, and others who agreed with him, were “primarily 
interested in achieving speedy cleanups.”243  In other words, those who 
favored an absolute bar to preenforcement review were concerned about 
cleanups being delayed by endless litigation.  Such concerns are not 
implicated in situations where, as in the Cannon case, no cleanup remedy 
has been undertaken.  Judicial review in such a situation does not delay 
anything because nothing is being done.  Thus, the equitable-factors 
analysis does not contravene the legislative history in favor of a more 
rigid application of the timing-of-review provision. 
This survey of the legislative history behind SARA highlights two 
important points.  First, certain members of Congress did not intend for 
the courts to apply the timing-of-review provision rigidly and 
mechanically.  Second, even those who favored a more strict application 
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did so based on concerns about delayed cleanups—a situation not 
implicated in the equitable-factors analysis.  Put simply, Congress 
intended to give courts room to maneuver in applying the timing-of-
review provision, except in the narrow factual scenario where a cleanup 
has already been undertaken.  The Supreme Court should use this latitude 
to create an analytical framework that will enable courts to equitably 
apply the timing-of-review provision. 
2. The Equitable Factors 
Before laying out the factors themselves, several preliminary issues 
must be addressed.  First, no one factor listed below is dispositive on the 
question of whether a court should review a response action before 
completion.  In any particular case, the decision to review a response 
action before it is completed will depend on the totality of the 
circumstances.  Second, not all factors will apply in any given situation.  
In fact, factors other than those listed here may have bearing on a 
particular case.  These factors are meant to provide a starting point. 
Finally, there are two threshold requirements.  First, consideration of 
these factors should only apply to a citizen suit by a party that is not a 
potentially responsible party.  Potentially responsible parties have too 
much incentive to delay cleanup in an effort to avoid incurring the 
expense of the process.  Furthermore, deciding whether a potentially 
responsible party’s intentions are in good faith is a difficult task that 
would unnecessarily complicate the application of the equitable-factors 
analysis.  Therefore, only citizen suits brought by parties that are not 
potentially responsible for the contamination should merit consideration 
of the following equitable factors.  Second, the equitable-factors analysis 
is only appropriate if the plaintiff has exhausted all other available means 
of attaining judicial review.  This requirement is beneficial because it 
ensures that plaintiffs explore more direct means of attaining judicial 
review before turning to the timing-of-review provision. 
a. Nature of the EPA’s Response Action 
The first equitable factor is the nature of the EPA’s response action.  
Specifically, the question is what exactly the EPA has done to remediate 
the contaminated waste site.  In both Frey and Cannon, the response 
actions involved studying, investigating, and analyzing the 
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contamination.244  Neither case involved much concrete action to remedy 
the contamination.  When the only response is study and analysis, the 
EPA should have more difficulty arguing that it has selected a response 
action that triggers the judicial-review bar.  Thus, a court should be more 
likely to grant precompletion judicial review if the nature of the response 
action is study and analysis rather than concrete steps to clean up the 
contamination.  Moreover, if the EPA is taking concrete steps to 
remediate a contaminated site, a court can more easily find that it is 
actively working to resolve the contamination.  When the only response 
is study and analysis, such a determination is harder to make.  This factor 
is useful because it clarifies what it means to select a response action.  
Generally, courts should require something more than study and analysis 
to meet the “selected” response action requirement for precluding 
judicial review. 
b. Duration of the EPA’s Response Action 
The second factor is the duration of the EPA’s response action.  The 
longer the duration of the response action without completion, the more 
likely a court should be to allow judicial review of the response action 
before it is complete.  In both Frey and Cannon, the EPA’s response 
action had been going on for decades.245  In such a circumstance—when 
decades have passed and no end appears in sight—a court should 
consider reviewing the EPA’s response action.  Otherwise, insulation 
from judicial review could result in agency complacency in moving 
forward with cleanup remedies.  Such a result goes against the purpose 
of CERCLA—the prompt cleanup of contaminated sites.246  Citizens 
need some way to spur agency action, and precompletion judicial review 
is an appropriate mechanism. 
Nonetheless, the EPA should still have the time it needs to 
effectively analyze contaminated sites and determine appropriate 
remedies.  This process is complex and undoubtedly takes time to 
accomplish.  However, deference to the EPA in undertaking an analysis 
of a contaminated site should not be without limits.  In evaluating 
whether it should hear a challenge to a response action before the action 
is completed, a court should consider whether it can find any objective 
measure by which to evaluate the EPA’s actions.  The court in Frey 
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discussed this issue, but did not elaborate on what would suffice as an 
adequate indicator.247  One option would be a documented timetable.  For 
instance, the EPA could spell out in its record of decision a timeline for 
the completion of the remediation process.  If the EPA is unable to meet 
its timetable, it could adjust the record of decision, or whatever 
document contains the timeline, to include a revised schedule.  This way, 
a court could see that the EPA is actively working to remediate a 
contaminated site, meaning the court should not grant judicial review of 
its response action until completion. 
At the most fundamental level, the basis for this factor is fairness.  A 
plaintiff should not have to wait decades for a site to be remediated 
without having some concrete reason for the delay.  Nor should the EPA 
be able to study a contaminated site indefinitely.  Plaintiffs deserve some 
recourse to compel remediation, or at the least, to compel some 
reasonable justification for why remediation will take so long to 
complete. 
c. Nature of the Harm Alleged 
The third factor that courts should consider is the nature of the harm 
alleged.  Generally, timing-of-review cases allege two types of harms: 
monetary harms248 and harms to human health and the environment.249  
These allegations present different risks.  Monetary harms do not present 
the same imminent and irreparable threat as harms to health and the 
environment.  Plaintiffs alleging monetary harms can be made whole 
after a response action is completed by recouping their money if their 
suit is meritorious.250  Therefore, it is not vital that a court redress a 
monetary harm before a response action is completed.  Accordingly, a 
court should not grant precompletion judicial review if the only alleged 
harm is monetary in nature. 
Allegations of potential harm to human health or the environment 
present more immediate dangers.  As long as hazardous chemicals 
remain in the ground, they pose risks to individuals and the surrounding 
environment.  Unlike monetary harms, if these risks eventuate, they 
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cannot be undone after the fact.  Therefore, a court should grant judicial 
review for allegations of harm to human health or the environment.  The 
likelihood of allowing precompletion judicial review should depend on 
the intensity of the risk.  The risk intensity will vary based on factors 
such as the amount of waste involved and the degree of toxicity of the 
chemicals.  The more danger an unremediated site poses, the more likely 
a court should be to grant judicial review of the response action before it 
is completed.  When asserting dangers to human health and the 
environment, plaintiffs should have to make more than conclusory 
allegations of potential harm.  They should have to produce evidence 
with specific information about the potential for and intensity of the 
harm.  If the risk of harm is great and the potential harm is particularly 
dangerous, a court should inquire into the remediation plan for a 
contaminated site.  Put simply, this factor helps determine the dangers in 
delaying judicial review.  If delaying judicial review presents serious 
dangers, courts should allow review sooner rather than later. 
d. Potential Economic Impact of Precluding Judicial Review 
The fourth factor that courts should consider is the potential 
economic impact on a plaintiff if precompletion judicial review is not 
allowed.  In Cannon, the plaintiffs alleged that they suffered economic 
harm from their inability to lease their mines, which were contaminated 
with hazardous chemicals.251  If a plaintiff is suffering economic harm 
because of the delay in remediating a contaminated site, a court should 
be more likely to review the response action.  This factor helps ensure 
that a plaintiff does not file a suit simply for dilatory purposes.  A 
plaintiff that is suffering economic harm has no motivation to delay the 
cleanup of his contaminated property because that will only result in 
more economic loss.  This factor thus helps courts weed out plaintiffs 
who might be attempting to game the system for improper purposes.  
Because allegations of economic harm are monetary in nature, plaintiffs 
must couple them with allegations of harm to human health or the 
environment to be eligible for precompletion judicial review. 
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e. Whether the Federal Government is Responsible for the 
Contamination 
The fifth and final factor for courts to consider is whether the federal 
government is responsible for the contamination.  In Cannon, ordnance 
tests by the U.S. military contaminated the Cannons’ property.252  Where 
the government is the source of contamination, courts should be more 
likely to review response actions before they are complete.  There are 
two reasons for this.  First, when the government is involved, the EPA 
might proceed more slowly, knowing that the government will ultimately 
incur the cost of remediation.  In essence, this situation creates a 
potential conflict of interest because the EPA is a government agency 
and the government is the responsible party.  Second, the government 
has more resources to pursue a cleanup than some private responsible 
parties do.  Therefore, it has the ability to proceed more quickly to 
remediate a site.  Based on these reasons, a court should question why 
the government is not more promptly remediating a site that it has 
contaminated. 
3. Policy Benefits of the Equitable-Factors Approach 
Adopting the equitable-factors analysis proposed by this Comment 
has several potential policy benefits.  First, the approach reduces 
litigation after the remediation is complete.  With a categorical bar to 
judicial review, the EPA does not have to justify its actions until after 
they are completed.  If the EPA missed something in designing its 
response action, its oversight will not be revealed until after the deficient 
plan has already been implemented.  If certain challenges to response 
actions could be heard before those actions are completed, EPA plans 
could be modified proactively to address any revealed deficiencies.  As a 
result, plaintiffs would have no need to litigate whether the response 
actions were adequate or appropriate.  Although the notice-and-comment 
period before the EPA selects a final remedy serves the same function, it 
is not always possible for all parties to express all comments and 
concerns about proposed remedies during this period.  Precompletion 
judicial review can serve as a backup method to ensure that all voices are 
heard as early in the process as possible. 
Second, the approach potentially saves money.  Imagine the 
following situation.  The EPA undertakes a response action that cannot 
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be challenged before completion.  The EPA spends money to complete 
this action.  After completion, a plaintiff sues, challenging the response 
action.  The suit is successful, and a court finds the EPA’s response 
action in violation of federal environmental law.  Either the plaintiffs are 
awarded monetary damages or the EPA is required to implement a new 
remediation strategy in accordance with federal environmental statutes.  
Either way, the EPA has spent money to implement a cleanup and then 
has to spend more money to pay damages, to plan and implement a 
revised cleanup strategy, or both.  This results in an inefficient allocation 
of scarce resources the EPA could use to fund other needed cleanups.  
While precompletion litigation could be costly, it is cheaper than 
spending money to implement a remediation plan and then spending 
more money to defend it in court. 
Third, the approach potentially offers flexibility.  Categorical laws 
tend to be rigid and reflect a one-size-fits-all mentality.  This is 
dangerous because a potential for extraordinary cases, not envisioned 
when the law was being drafted, always exists.  In the context of the 
timing-of-review provision, Frey and Cannon demonstrate such 
extraordinary situations.  Thus, the Tenth Circuit’s strict interpretation of 
the timing-of-review provision harmed the Cannons when in fact 
Congress designed the provision to help people like the Cannons who 
suffered as a result of owning contaminated land.  The equitable-factors 
approach proposed in this Comment would alleviate the rigidity of the 
timing-of-review provision and make it flexible enough to deal with 
unusual situations like those in Frey and Cannon. 
Of course, these factors are applicable beyond just the situations in 
Frey and Cannon.  The equitable-factors analysis would be useful in two 
general contexts.  First, it is useful in any situation where the EPA has 
initiated a response action that drags on without any apparent end in 
sight.  Second, the approach helps in any situation where no concrete 
action has been undertaken even though an extended period of time has 
elapsed since the contamination was uncovered.  Thus, employing the 
equitable-factors analysis gives the timing-of-review provision the 
flexibility it needs to deal with the divergent situations to which it will be 
applied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The problem of remediating sites contaminated with hazardous 
substances is a vexing issue in the United States today.  While cleaning 
up these dangerous sites is a prudent course of action, figuring out how 
to do so poses many challenges.  Congress acted wisely when enacting 
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CERCLA, putting into effect a regulatory and legal framework to 
oversee the process of cleaning up contaminated waste sites.  Despite 
Congress’s efforts, CERCLA remains flawed.  In particular, the timing-
of-review provision added under SARA is poorly worded, which has 
resulted in divergent—and sometimes inequitable—results when applied 
by various district and circuit courts.  Ideally, Congress should revise the 
timing-of-review provision to explicitly provide the flexibility needed to 
apply it in an equitable way in all situations.  Congress has given no 
indication, however, that it will act in this regard any time soon, given 
the many other important issues it currently faces. 
Because Congress appears unlikely to revise the timing-of-review 
provision in the foreseeable future, the courts should fashion some relief.  
Certain courts, such as the one in Frey, have tried to do so, while others, 
such as the one in Cannon, have hewed closer to the plain language of 
the statute and have stated that it is not their place to resolve this issue.  
Given that the interpretation of the timing-of-review provision has 
generated a circuit split, it is time for the Supreme Court to provide 
clarification about the operation and application of this provision.  By 
applying the equitable-factors analysis laid out in this Comment, the 
Court could create a more evenhanded interpretation of the timing-of-
review provision.  Such an analysis will give plaintiffs with no other 
avenues a chance to have justice.  As its title implies, the timing-of-
review provision is designed to affect the timing of judicial review; it 
should not be used to extinguish it altogether. 
 
